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Monday, February 13, 2012

Al Kadesih Sniper Rifle and Iraq Sniper

Al Kadesih Iraq’s snipers have a plentiful supply of Soviet SVD sniper rifles (Dragunov sniper Rifle) or the Iraqi built version, the Al Kadesih Sniper Rifle. Despite being captured by the thousands in 2003, Saddam Hussein’s internal security and special operations units earlier had cached stockpiles of such rifles, enough to sustain the current level of sniping. An indicator of the al Kadesih’s prestigious image is that Saddam had hundreds possibly thousands of them gold-plated for presentations. These gold rifles have become the war’s most sought after GI souvenir.


Depending on the source, the Al Kadesih Sniper Rifle is comparably accurate or slightly less accurate than its Russian SVD cousin, probably in the realm of 2 MOA. I cannot say for certain because I’ve not test-fired the al Kadesih. But clearly, this rifle in many ways is identical to the SVD, its most distinctive difference being the absence of a cheekrest. Some magazines have a palm tree stamped on them and are not interchangeable with the SVD. I’ve not come upon a single incident of an Iraqi sniper using a bolt-action rifle, although one boasted to a journalist that he was purchasing a quality European bolt-action rifle.

SVD Sniper Rifles

Dragunov Sniper Rifle

As a rule, the Iraqi sniper does not have a radio, but sometimes he communicates via a cell phone which, if you think about it, is much less incriminating if he’s stopped by security forces. Likewise, he carries no gear beyond his rifle and perhaps one spare magazine, both to remain flexibly mobile and to keep it simple to discard incriminating evidence when he must blend back into the population. While on an operation he often wears a black balaclava, a practice perhaps influenced by similarly attired Palestinian terrorists. Partially this ski mask generates a mystique, but more practically it also conceals his identity so he cannot be identified by Iraqi bystanders. Some Iraqi snipers further hide their identities behind a nom de guerre or code name.

Before analyzing the Iraqi insurgent sniper’s other attributes, keep in mind that he’s a terrorist first, who’s capable of any kind of act to further his cause without regard to law or ethics or what a Westerner would consider morality. An inseparable seam connects him to his comrades who bomb public places and kill helpless hostages with little remorse. Every day he violates the Laws of Land Warfare by wearing civilian clothes, assassinating civilians, continuing to shoot incapacitated soldiers and marines, escaping sniping incidents in ambulances, purposely firing behind a human shield of women and children, and operating from mosques. Expect no quarter from him and do not be surprised by his outrages.

Al Kadesih Sniper rifle

Explaining his motivation, one Iraqi sniper told the London Sunday Times, “When I snipe at my target and watch him drop, I feel elated dizzy with ecstasy. I fall on the ground, shouting to God, calling Allah akbar, for God is indeed great. When their snipers kill one of us, we go to heaven as martyrs. But when we kill them they go to hell.” Based on the threat they pose, I’ve categorized Iraq’s insurgent snipers into three classes: the “potshot sniper,” the “trained marksman,” and the “one shot-one kill”sniper.


The potshot sniper is a relatively untrained civilian who has acquired a scoped rifle. His zealotry exceeds his ability, although he’s reasonably deadly at 100 to 200 yards about two city blocks close enough that he doesn’t need to master range estimation, wind compensation, etc., to hit targets. Reminiscent of the Hitler Youth snipers who fought in the closing days of World War II, he got started with as little as a couple hours of instruction. Someone else may even have zeroed his rifle for him, but all he needs to know is how to hold the crosshairs on his target. Most potshot snipers will be captured or killed before they learn enough to be called snipers, although experience alone eventually will elevate some to that level. Very roughly, I’d estimate this category constitutes half the snipers in Iraq.


Above him is the trained marksman, probably a former military or sport shooter who knows how to fire a rifle competently, but he’s not sniper-trained and lacks sniper experience. He can hit dinner-plate-sized targets accurately at 200 to 400 yards, or smaller and partially exposed targets at closer ranges. If he absorbs his experiences, he can be as deadly as a schooltrained sniper in a few months. The trained marksman comprises perhaps 40 to 45 percent of insurgent sniper ranks. The smallest category is that of the school-trained, fully qualified, one shot-one kill sniper, or those with enough experience from Chechnya or elsewhere that they’ve previously qualified on the job.
 

They represent 5 or at the most 10 percent of enemy snipers. One of Iraq’s more accomplished
snipers allegedly with Above him is the trained marksman, probably a former military or sport shooter who knows how to fire a rifle competently, but he’s not sniper-trained and lacks sniper experience. He can hit dinner-plate-sized targets accurately at 200 to 400 yards, or smaller and partially exposed targets at closer ranges. If he absorbs his experiences, he can be as deadly as a schooltrained sniper in a few months. The trained marksman comprises perhaps 40 to 45 percent of insurgent sniper ranks.
 

The smallest category is that of the school-trained, fully qualified, one shot-one kill sniper, or those with enough experience from Chechnya or elsewhere that they’ve previously qualified on the job. They represent 5 or at the most 10 percent of enemy snipers. One of Iraq’s more accomplished snipers allegedly with 23 kills told a British interviewer that he learned his skills via the Internet and by playing videogames which I don’t believe for a second. Do you just suppose that he attended a sniper course, perhaps outside Iraq, which he would never have admitted to a foreign journalist?


All these snipers watch U.S. forces and study their tactics and techniques. They understand what a Quick Reaction Force is and how it operates and have learned to fire and flee before a QRF can contain them for a cordon and search. Repeatedly, I found Iraqi insurgent media boasting that American cordons were not in place fast enough to prevent a sniper’s escape.

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