RUSSIA AND INDONESIA A NEW BEGINNING Military Power Asia

The perils of become overly dependent on a narrow group of suppliers was brought home to Indonesia in 1999 when it found itself hit with a defence equipment supply embargo, firstly by the US and then by the European Union countries. The embargo was to last six years only being lifted at the end of 2005.

For Indonesia to consequences of this embargo were severe. The Indonesian Air Force (TNI-AU) provides
conclusive proof of this fact. At that time the prime combat aircraft asset of the TNI-AU was the fleet of
seven Lockheed Martin F-16A Block 15 OCU and three Lockheed Martin F-16B Block 15 OCU aircraft.
By the time the embargo was lifted the F-16A/B fleet had been reduced to four flyable aircraft. The TNI-AU
fleet of 20 Lockheed Martin C-130B, KC-130B, C-130H and C-130H-30 transport aircraft provides another example of the effect of the embargo, by the time the embargo was lifted, the C-130 fleet was down to some six flyable aircraft.

The six year long embargo impacted on all areas of the Indonesian military and these harsh lessons demonstrated that supplier base diversity made tremendous good sense. That discovery was not rocket science. The only problem was finding alternative suppliers across the complete spectrum of defence equipment from the high to the low end. What Indonesia needed first and foremost was a credible source of combat aircraft, helicopters, surface ships, submarines, armoured vehicles and other sophisticated
equipment. In the end such a source was found in the form of Russia.

All of which was somewhat ironic, as for a period in the late 1950s and early 1960s up to 1965, the Soviet
Union was the leading supplier of defence equipment to Indonesia. To put that statement into context, Soviet
military aid turned the TNI into arguably one of the most significant military powers in Asia. Soviet military assistance was just enormous in scope.

The TNI-Al received a Sverdlov class cruiser, seven Skory class destroyers, seven Riga class frigates, 12 Komar class missile craft along with 25 P-15 (Styx) anti-ship missiles, 14 P6 fast attack craft, eight Kronstadt class patrol craft, 18 BK patrol craft, six T-43 minesweepers, an Atrek class support ship, a Don class support ship, two Bunju class tankers and three Type 577 Uda class oilers. On top of this came 12 Project 613 Whiskey class submarines (SSK), with two more supplied from Poland.

The situation as regards the supply of aircraft and helicopters was equally as impressive. Systems included 26 MiG-21F-13 aircraft plus 156 R-13S (AA-2 Atoll) air-to-air missiles, 35 MiG-19, 30 MiG-17 (ex-Czech), 40 MiG-17PF (Polish LIM-5P), 15 MiG-15UTI (ex-Czech), 18 Aero L-29 (ex-Czech), 44 Ilyushin Il-28/Il-28T/Il-28U bombers (some ex-Czech), 24 Tupolev Tu-16 bombers plus 96 KS-1 (Kennel) air-to-surface missiles, 28 Ilyushin Il-14 transports (Czech Avia produced), nine Antonov An-12 transports, eight Mil Mi-1 (Polish SM-1 version) helicopters, 36 Mil Mi-4A/Mi-4M helicopters and eight Mil Mi-6T helicopters.

As if that were not enough an S-75 Dvina (SA-2) air defence missile system along with 24 missiles was supplied, S-60 57 mm and M1939 37 mm anti-aircraft guns, 10 BRDM-1, 30 BTR-152, 100 BTR-40 and 66 BTR-50 armoured vehicles and 50 PT-76 light tanks, other tanks, K-61 amphibious transport vehicles, BM-14 140 mm multiple rocket launchers, other artillery systems and much else besides was delivered.

 Soviet military aid to the TNI was, as the above listing shows, immense in scope. Yet after 1965, and the break in relations with the Soviet Union, this vast inventory of defence equipment gradually degraded in many cases to become worse than useless. Some equipment was sustainable, for example the PT-76, BTR-40, BTR-50, K-61 and the air defence guns for example. As for the remainder, some resides in museums around Indonesia and the rest was scrapped.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new states such as Russia from the wreckage,
there was a new set of defence industry players entering the regional marketplace. However, with the exception of a few small purchases of small arms and parachutes in the 1990s, Indonesia proved less than receptive to the possibilities offered by the Russian defence industry. Arguably there was also no need from the Indonesian side to entertain purchasing Russian equipment, as it would have been incompatible with existing TNI equipment and operational practices.

Then in 1997 there appeared to be a real programme in prospect, with significant interest being shown
in the acquisition of up 20 Sukhoi Su-27 combat aircraft. Eventually this potential contract collapsed for political and financial reasons, but it was an indication that Russia and Indonesia were moving closer to a supplierclient relationship.