CHINA ARMY MODERNIZING PLA GROUND FORCE

Rapid defense modernization is a logical priority for a technologically challenged, combat-inexperienced military focused on a mission that might bring it into conflict with the world’s most powerful armed force. Faced with the potential for such a conflict in the Taiwan Strait and backed by the strong conviction that use of force in certain cross-Strait circumstances would not only be justified but legally required, China’s central leadership has set in motion over the past decade an Army building program of impressive scope and scale. The progress of this peacetime modernization effort, particularly given the low baseline from which it was launched, is perhaps exceeded in the past century only by the rise of the Wehrmacht in the 1930s and the transformation of the U.S. military between 1980 and the first Gulf War.

Despite a modernization effort covering to some extent every aspect of military force structure and posture, the Chinese have clearly prioritized development of capabilities to severely damage Taiwan in the event of a conflict over the island’s stance on perpetual separation from the mainland and to deter or slow U.S. responses to such a conflict. As such, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) ground force has played fourth fiddle to missile, air, and naval forces in terms of modernization priority. It has not, however, been forgotten.2 The PLA remains a Party Army in an era when the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) grip is less than firm PLA ground forces remain the primary arbiter of Party control throughout the country, key contributors to Beijing’s foreign policy initiatives, and protectors of a 22,000-kilometer land boundary adjacent to a number of current and potential flash points.

The ground force is also preparing for a Taiwan contingency, albeit with a lower profile than its sister services.  While China appears to be avoiding for now telltale programs to greatly increase amphibious and
airlift capacity to project ground forces onto Taiwan, the PLA continues to train and equip task-organized
brigades and divisions to fight an island landing campaign. Beijing wants to avoid alarming U.S. and regional neighbors with an overt preparation for force projection operations but has positioned a defense industrial base to provide, when needed, the projection platforms for a force trained and organized to attack
Taiwan and occupy, at least temporarily, key terrain.

Analysts debate the real level of Chinese spending on military programs the figure is certainly higher than official pronouncements but China’s economic growth ensures that military programs are wellfunded
even in the context of a national development plan that prioritizes civil programs over martial. This fertile ground for continued, rapid modernization is made even more productive given that military and dual-use technologies are flowing into China with few constraints.5 There is little reason to believe that this situation will change substantially over the next decade, although it would be a mistake to assume any particular intent for military employment beyond the general missions already mentioned.